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ABSTRACT 
      
Using a workplace survey from Malaysia (the 2007 Productivity Investment Climate Survey), 
this paper examines the incidence, determinants and consequences of overskilling in the 
Malaysian manufacturing sector. The degree of overskilling is found to be low relative to 
other comparable countries and lower among the more highly educated but higher among 
those who are overeducated. Workplace characteristics such as share of workforce with 
university qualifications, hiring practices, capital intensity, and degree of competition, all 
seem to have an impact on the probability of overskilling. Overskilling is also found to 
reduce an individual’s earnings and has a negative impact upon firm performance.   
Keywords: overskilling, overeducation, earnings, Malaysia 
JEL Classifications: J24, J31  
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1. Introduction   
Over the last thirty years, many low or middle income countries have invested heavily 
in their educational systems. Though educational attainment has risen there has been limited 
attention paid to the quality of match between a worker’s education and skills and that 
required in the workplace (Mehta et al., 2010). Indeed, the vast bulk of research on the 
utilisation of education and skills in the labour market focuses on the developed countries 
with the various reviews by Hartog (2000), Sloane (2003), McGuiness (2006), Oosterbeek 
and Leuven (2011) making little or no mention of matching in low or middle income labour 
markets.1 The stems principally from a lack of data in these countries on the education or 
skills required to perform in a job (Mehta et al., 2010).  
This study examines match quality in Malaysia. Malaysia is a middle-income country 
which has, since the 1970s, moved from being a primary goods exporter to one that is much 
more reliant on manufacturing and services. Education has played a pivotal role in this 
transformation with higher levels of investment and educational attainment (UNDP, 2009). 
As the proportion of the population with secondary and tertiary education has increased 
significantly from 46% in 1985 to 77% in 2004, doubts have been inevitably raised about the 
quality of matching in the Malaysian labour market (Lim et al. 2008; World Bank, 2009).   
A unique workplace dataset from 2007 (Productivity Investment Climate Survey) is 
utilised and this offers a number of key advantages. First, it contains extensive information on 
the skills and educational requirements of jobs allowing for an analysis of both overeducation 
and overskilling. Traditionally the mismatch literature has focused on overeducation (i.e. 
comparing actual educational attainment with the formal education required in the job) 
though it is broadly acknowledged that this is a far too narrow indicator of mismatch 
(Mavromaras et al. 2009 ). Overskilling (the extent to which workers are not able to utilise all 
their skills and knowledge in their current employment) is a broader concept going beyond 
formal educational qualifications and is perhaps better at controlling for unobserved 
individual differences in skills, ability and knowledge (Mavromaras et al. 2009, 2010).  
Second, overskilling allows us to investigate the quality of an employer–employee match 
across the whole spectrum of educational attainment. This is not feasible when we use formal 
education qualifications, as being overeducated makes little sense for the large number of 
workers with low or minimal educational qualifications.  Third, having a matched employer-
                                                
1 This is somewhat surprising since Blaug (1973) in his classic study, identified graduates in India as accepting lower paid jobs that were 
incompatible with their educational qualifications.  
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worker dataset allows for an analysis of matching at both an individual and workplace level 
allowing us to ascertain how firm-level characteristics influence match quality and how 
match quality impacts on firm performance. As far as we are aware, overskilling has only 
seriously been examined at the individual level (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; 
Mavromaras et al., 2009; Mavromaras et al., 2010; McGuinness and Sloane, 2010) though a 
small literature has examined overeducation at the workplace level (Battu et al., 2003). An 
exception is a study by Belfield (2010) which examines overskilling at the workplace level 
using UK data. 
Given this we have four sets of objectives. First, we document the extent of 
educational and skills mismatch for individuals. Second, we investigate the determinants of 
overskilling not only across workers but also across workplaces, i.e. the determinants of 
workplace overskilling. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which overskilling is  
influenced by workplace hiring practices, firm size, capital intensity and the presence of 
competitors. Here, we investigate whether the overeducated are also more likely to be 
overskilled. Third, we explore the effect of overskilling on earnings from the perspective of 
both the individual and the workplace. Fourth, we examine whether there are externalities 
associated with overskilling by examining the effects of overskilling on a firm’s performance 
in terms of absenteeism, quit rates, productivity, total output and sales.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines our data, presents some 
descriptive statistics and outlines how we measure match quality. Section 3 focuses on our 
empirical findings focusing on the determinants of individual and workplace overskilling, the 
effects of match quality on earnings and the effects of overskilling on a firm’s performance. 
The final section provides a few concluding remarks.  
 
2. The Data 
  The data used in this paper is taken from the second survey of the Malaysian 
Productivity Investment Climate Survey (PICS-II) which was carried out in 2007.2 This is a 
workplace survey and a collaborative effort between the World Bank and the Malaysian 
Government. The survey attempts to understand the investment climate faced by enterprises 
and how this impacts upon business performance. The survey provides information on a wide 
                                                
2 The first (PICS-I) was administered in 2002, and though it contained an individual and firm survey, we have no access to the individual-
level data. 
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range of workplace and firm characteristics, product market characteristics, workplace 
performance and management practices.  
  PICS-II covers the manufacturing and business support services sectors with 1,115 
firms in the former (across nine industries) 3 and 303 firms in the latter.  Here we focus on the 
manufacturing sector since this is representative of the manufacturing sector as a whole 
(World Bank, 2009).4,5 For each of the workplaces, structured interviews were conducted 
with the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), general managers or business owners. In addition, 
the management were asked to arrange for the completion of a “Workplace Characteristics 
Questionnaire” seeking data, for example, on the level and composition of employment. Self-
administered questionnaires were also distributed to up to ten random samples of full-time 
employees at all workplaces where the senior manager had agreed to employee involvement. 
This sought information on the usual array of demographic and work-related information as 
well as human capital endowments (i.e. earnings, previous and current job, education, skills, 
training, and work experience). The response rate here is high with the target number of ten 
full-time workers being successfully interviewed in 94% of workplaces.     
 The individual and workplace surveys are merged so that the information set is rich in 
details on multiple workers per workplace. We confined our attention to respondents who 
were in full-time employment, aged between 15 and 64, who reported positive earnings and 
to workplaces where more than four workers had responded to the worker survey. Since we 
are only interested in Malaysian workers, we excluded foreign workers from the analysis.6 
This leaves us with 9,078 workers (split evenly by gender) across 1,043 manufacturing firms.  
  Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics focusing on a set of key variables. 
Respondents are on average 35 years of age and reported to have about 10 years of schooling 
which is equivalent in Malaysia to upper secondary qualifications. They have also 
accumulated on average around 14 years of work experience (equivalent to 165 months), 7.6 
                                                
3 The nine are food processing, textiles, garments, wood and furniture, chemical and chemical products, rubber and plastics, machinery and 
equipment, electrical and electronics, motor vehicles and parts.  
4 According to the World Bank (2009, p. 170): “ …. the sampling methodology of PICS-II: (1) generates a sample representative of the 
whole economy that substantiates assertions about the manufacturing and business support services sectors; and (2) generates large enough 
sample sizes for selected industries to conduct statistically robust analyses.” However, since business services are only a subset of the 
service sector we exclude them from our analysis. Appendix 1 assesses the representativeness of PICS-II through a comparison with other 
Malaysian data sources. 
5 According to 2014 Malaysian Labour Force Survey around 17% of Malaysian jobs in 2013 were in manufacturing with around half in 
services.   
6 Foreign workers account for nearly 12% of the total sample in the manufacturing sector. The majority of foreign workers were attached to 
unskilled jobs and most of them come from Asian countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and India. 
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years of job tenure within firms and 42% had once attended a training course. Women are 
slightly younger than men (34 versus 36 years) and men have more work experience and job 
tenure than women (15 years and 8 years respectively versus 12.4 years and 7 years 
respectively). However, women are slightly better educated with 24% holding higher 
educational qualifications (both diploma and university qualifications) relative to 19% 
amongst men. Though a quarter of women occupy higher job levels (management and 
professional) compared to 22% of men, women are twice as likely as men to be working in 
unskilled jobs. Men work on average two hours longer per week than women and earn around 
20% more than women in terms of hourly earnings.7  With respect to firm characteristics, on 
average, firms are well established and mature, with an average life of 33 years. Around 40% 
of the firms have less than 50 employees with 30% being wholly or partly foreign owned.  
 As stated earlier, the PICS-II allows us to examine various types of match quality. 
Overskilling measures are constructed using respondents responses to the following two 
statements: 
i. Your current job offers you sufficient scope to use your knowledge and skills8  
and  
ii. You would perform better in your current job if you possess additional 
knowledge and skills 
For both statements, four responses were available: do not agree at all, somewhat 
agree, agree and agree completely (Table 2). Around 70% of respondents agreed or 
completely agreed with statement one with similar responses across gender.  To aid our later 
empirical estimations, we collapsed the four responses into three to create a new variable, 
termed overskilling (see bottom panel of Table 2).  Those with response 1 are classified as 
severely over-skilled, those with response 2 are classified as moderately over-skilled, and 
those with responses 3 or 4 are classified as well-matched. The extent of overskilling (both 
severely and moderate) is around 31% and this is low compared to the 53% (severe and 
                                                
7 Information on income is available on a monthly basis. However, since there is information on hours of work per week we can calculate 
hourly earnings by dividing the monthly salary by 4.3 and then further dividing it by the average number of hours worked per week (World 
Bank, 2009). 
8 This statement is similar to that used elsewhere. Allen and van der Velden (2001) measure overskilling from the statement: “My current 
job offers me sufficient scope to use my knowledge and skills”. Green and McIntosh (2002) combine responses to two statements: “In my 
current job I have enough opportunity to use the knowledge and skills that I have”; and “How much of your past experience, skills and 
abilities can you make use of in your present job?” 
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moderate) reported for the UK by Belfield (2010) and the 44% for Australia found in 
Mavromaras et al. (2010).9 
The responses to statement ii are also set out in Table 3. Again we collapsed the four 
responses into three with responses 1 and 2 being classified as well-matched, response 3 as 
moderately underskilled and response 4 as severely underskilled. The extent of skills deficit 
at around 80% seems high relative to other countries.10 For the UK, Green and McIntosh 
(2007) find that nearly two-thirds of workers have a skill deficit though severe underskilling 
is only 13% compared with our estimate of 26%. Allen and van der Velden (2001) in the 
Netherlands report an underskilling incidence for workers of 50% though they focus only on 
graduate workers.  
More conventional overeducation measures are constructed using the following 
statements:  
iii. According to you, what is the most appropriate level of education for the work 
you are doing? 
iv. According to you, what is the most appropriate field of education for the work 
you are doing? 
Under statement iii, there are six educational levels to choose from, from (1) degree, 
to (6) informal/no qualification. By comparing the survey respondents’ actual educational 
attainment with the perceived appropriate education required for the job,11 we derived 
conventional estimates of overeducation and these are presented in Table 4. Less than a fifth 
(18.5%) of workers are overeducated, whilst 52% are adequately matched, and about 30% are 
undereducated. It is difficult to compare these estimates with those found elsewhere since 
there is considerable variation in the incidence of overeducation across the different measures 
used. Nevertheless, the incidence of overeducation in Malaysia seems to be at the lower end 
of the existing estimates. Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) undertake a meta-analysis 
based on data from 25 overeducation studies and find that the incidence of overeducation 
varies from 10% to 42% with the unweighted average for overeducation standing at 23.3%.  
A recent review by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) reports a mean overeducation rate across 
                                                
9 McGuinness and Wooden (2007) and Mavromaras et al. (2009) for Australia report a rate of severe overskilling of up to 15% and 
moderate overskilling of up to 29%. 
10 The problem of skills deficits is acknowledged by a recent World Bank report (World Bank, 2010), which stated that “despite Malaysia’s 
impressive development in the last few years, many Malaysians have not been able to fully benefit from the country’s growth. One major 
challenge is that many workers lack the necessary skills to be productive in the fast changing and increasingly competitive labor market”.   
11 We are assuming that the appropriate level of education equates with the minimum education required for the job. 
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studies of 30% with self-assessment approaches having an average overeducation rate of 
37%.12   
For statement iv, there are four options available: (1) only your own field; (2) related 
to my field; (3) completely different from my field; and (4) no specific fields are required for 
this job. Over half of the respondents (Table 5) were reported to be working in jobs unrelated 
to their field of education and only 7% of workers were matched to their own specific field of 
education. These findings are close to those found in Allen and van der Valden (2001) for the 
Netherlands but higher than that found in Robst (2008) for the US, where only 20% of the 
sample reported that their field of study and work were not related. The differences may 
reflect the use of different samples (i.e. a graduate sample versus a sample of the whole 
workforce).13 For convenience purpose, we categorised the four responses into two categories 
– only your/related to your field (response 1 and 2) and outside own field (response 3 and 4). 
 The correlation between the overskilling and overeducation measures is found to be 
low indicating that the two matching measures are quite different entities (Table 6). Of those 
who are overeducated, about a third are considered to be overskilled (a quarter are 
moderately overskilled and less than ten percent are severely overskilled).  This compares 
with an equivalent figure of half found in Green and McIntosh (2007) and Mavromaras et al. 
(2009). Similarly, only around one in five of the moderately overskilled and one in four of the 
severely overskilled (Table 7) are identified as overeducated (using the level of education 
measure), though a larger proportion of overskilled workers (i.e. over 60%) are identified as 
overeducated under the field of study measure (statement iv).  A simple Spearman rank order 
test reveals a positive correlation between overeducation and both moderately and severely 
overskilled, though the correlation coefficient is not strong, at less than 0.1.14  
                                                
12 As stated earlier, there are very few comparable middle or developing country studies. Hung (2008), using data for Taiwan, finds an 
overeducation rate of 46% using a measure which is similar to ours while Yue and Yang (2005) find that 21% of Chinese graduates in 2003 
were overeducated. 
13 Indeed, when we restrict our sample to graduate workers (diploma and university qualifications), our estimates are in line with Robst 
(2008) with about 21% of graduates working in jobs which are not related to their field of study. 
14 A similar weak correlation between overeducation and overskilling was found by Green and McIntosh (2007) and Allen and van der 
Valden (2001) with the former finding a correlation of 0.2.  
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3. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
3.1 Determinants of Worker Overskilling 
Here we examine the factors that potentially drive individual worker overskilling in the 
labour market. For this purpose, we employ a multinomial logit regression model for both 
severe and moderate overskilling for males and females. Table 8 reports the marginal effects 
estimated from the multinomial logit at the sample means.15 The effects of a range of 
demographic, human capital and workplace characteristics are assessed. 
With respect to our demographic variables, we find that gender and marital status play 
no discernible role in determining the degree of overskilling. However, the presence of 
children under 12 years of age in a household does matter in that it boosts the likelihood for 
women being in matched jobs. This seems a little counterintuitive since one would expect the 
presence of children to be a greater constraint for females perhaps generating more mismatch 
via a more narrowly defined spatial job search (Frank, 1978; Mincer, 1978). With regards to 
ethnicity, being Chinese and Indian female significantly increases the risk of moderate 
overskilling relative to being in the majority ethnic Malay group.  
A range of human capital variables are included and our general finding is that 
overskilling is lower for those with higher qualifications with this effect being more evident 
for those qualifications that are more closely aligned with the labour market. Other factors 
being equal, having a college diploma reduces the risk of being severely overskilled 
(moderately overskilled) by between 3.7 and 5.4% (between 4.7% and 10.5%) regardless of 
gender. This is perhaps not surprising since college diplomas are more closely tied to job 
requirements and are offered in Malaysia by polytechnic institutions, vocational training 
centres and private colleges. In contrast, many University degree qualifications are not 
occupation specific.  In line with Belfield (2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2009), increased 
training (with current or previous firm) is found to reduce the possibility of being in a 
moderately overskilled position although this holds only for males. Similarly, the incidence 
of moderate overskilling is reduced by 4.7 percentage points amongst those with additional 
                                                
15 The marginal effects are calculated by first working out predicted probabilities on the basis of  certain default characteristics and then 
varying each of the characteristics in turn to see how the predicted probability changes.  
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professional certification, but again, this is evident for men only. Professional certification 
refers to additional qualifications from polytechnics and vocational training institutes. 
Now, we focus our attention on the effects of a range of workplace characteristics. For 
this, we re-estimated Table 8 by including a vector of workplace characteristics and the 
results are presented in Table 9. The log-likelihood ratio test is found to be statistically 
significantly different from zero so that the full model (the model with the inclusion of 
workplace characteristics) is preferable over the model without workplace characteristics.16  
In line with our previous findings on individual education, we find that workplaces 
that employ more educated workers have lower overskilling. Perhaps workplaces that are 
skewed towards hiring more educated workers have better scope for improving match 
quality. In particular, our results reveal that firms where graduate workers, particularly the 
male sample account for over 50% of the workforce have a lower risk of workers being 
severely overskilled.17 With respect to firm size, one argument may be that larger firms may 
be more likely to employ graduates and where they do they may find it easier to 
accommodate their skills and education. However, we find no discernible relationship 
between firm size and skills mismatch. Firms with higher foreign ownership (i.e. workplace 
is more than 30% foreign owned) are associated with increased moderate overskilling (albeit 
only for the pooled and male sample). Firms with less than 30% foreign ownership decrease 
the risk of severe overskilling. 
One may also argue that capital intensive-firms may require more highly skilled 
workers relative to labour-intensive firms so that skills underutilisation may be more evident 
in the latter. Following Battu et al. (2003) and Belfield (2010), firms where labour costs 
account for less than 25% of total costs are assumed to be capital intensive while an 
establishment where labour costs denote over 75% of total costs is classified as labour-
intensive. Our results here support this basic hypothesis. In particular, a higher risk of severe 
overskilling is prevalent for labour-intensive firms (labour costs account for over 75%) as 
revealed in the male samples.  
Our results also reveal that the extent of skill mismatch differs by how much 
competition a firm faces.  A higher number of competitors (i.e. more than 25) decreases 
(increases) the likelihood of males being severely (moderately) overskilled compared to a 
monopoly position (i.e. no competitors). Increased competition perhaps keeps firms more “on 
                                                
16 The coefficients on the covariates already discussed remain largely unchanged in terms of sign and statistical significance.  
17 This variable is obtained using managers’ statement on the percentage of workforce with some university and other qualifications.  
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their toes” in terms of ensuring good matches. Our results here contrast with Belfield (2010) 
who finds no effect via competition.  
Belfield (2010) also argues that workplace mismatch may be higher where firms have 
weak hiring systems and where they do not properly check worker capabilities before hiring. 
Here, we have information on the key factors that employers consider when hiring (“hiring 
practices”) and in particular managers were asked to list the important criteria used to hire 
workers. The three that were deemed the most important for hiring employees were 
education, work experience, and technical skills. Other factors such as loyalty and 
interpersonal skills were seen as less important. We therefore control for these three criteria 
in hiring and ascertain their impact on overskilling. The results are not clear cut and do vary 
by gender. Where education is emphasised in hiring workers there is a lower risk of severe 
overskilling (pooled and male samples) and a higher risk of moderate overskilling (pooled 
and female samples).  When work experience is used as the main criteria for hiring, this 
raises the risk of moderate and severe overskilling in general and moderate overskilling for 
females only. In contrast, an emphasis on technical skills based hiring results in a fall in 
severe overskilling. Finally, there is some evidence that firms providing on-the-job training at 
the workplace (albeit only for the female sample) increase the workers’ odds of being in jobs 
that correspond to their skills. This is in line with our earlier finding that workers with greater 
participation in on-the-job training have a better job-match quality.18 
In Table 10, we summarise our results with respect to the relationship between 
overeducation and overskilling and the extent to which overskilling is determined by 
overeducation. We run a multinomial logit regression estimate (marginal effects) with our 
overeducation terms included as covariates. These are entered separately and in specification 
3 entered jointly. The other covariates are similar to those in Table 8 and 9, and the results are 
broadly in line with both the tables and so not reported here.  
There are three key findings. First, workers working in jobs below their own level 
(overeducated) or outside their own field (outside own field) have a higher probability of 
being overskilled. Second, the effects are stronger when educational mismatch is measured 
                                                
18 A number of effects are not reported in our tables and are worth mentioning. A higher share of females at the workplace reduces the 
probability for workers to be moderately overskilled, especially amongst females themselves. There is also some modest evidence that 
where firms are experiencing staff shortages this increases the probability of moderate overskilling (albeit only for females). This is 
somewhat surprising since one might expect that firms that face difficulties in filling vacancies may upgrade the job tasks for their current 
workers and so reduce the extent of overskilling.   Furthermore, a well-matched job seems more likely for firms listed in the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE).  
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via field of education. In particular, working “outside own field” results in higher severe and 
moderate overskilling across all three samples.  Third, the penalties are higher in terms of 
moderate overskilling. To some extent, these results suggest that educational mismatch seems 
to be a sufficient if not necessary condition for explaining the phenomenon of skill 
underutilisation. This is because working outside one’s own field of study or below the 
respondents’ actual educational level to some extent limits the workers’ ability or opportunity 
to use their knowledge and skills thus resulting in overskilling.  
 
3.2 Determinants of Workplace Overskilling  
Here, we examine the determinants of overskilling at the level of the workplace. 
Three separate regressions are run with our dependant variable being the percentage of the 
workforce who are overskilled, moderately overskilled and severely overskilled (calculated 
using workers’ responses) and these are regressed against the same workplace characteristics 
as before (taken from the managerial survey) with the results being presented in Table 11. In 
terms of the educational composition of the workforce and training the results are in line with 
those from the worker responses. Workplaces where more than 50% of workers have 
university qualifications have lower general and severe overskilling and workplaces that 
provide on-the-job training programmes have lower general and moderate overskilling. The 
results with respect to firm size, degree of foreign ownership, labour costs and hiring 
practices reveal little. There is some evidence that large firms (more than 150 employees) 
have lower overskilling at the workplace. With respect to hiring practices systems, education-
based hiring is the only recruitment practice with a significant relationship, i.e. it lowers the 
rate of severe overskilling at the workplace.   
 
3.3 The Effect of Overskilling and Overeducation on Earnings 
Table 12 provides the results from two sets of estimations examining the effects of moderate 
and severe overskilling on individual earnings. Specification 1 controls for only individual-
level characteristics (human capital endowments, demographic characteristics and job 
attributes) and specification 2 incorporates workplace-specific level variables such as the type 
of industry, firm size, firm ownership, hiring practices, labour costs and the educational 
composition of the workplace.  
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Both OLS and random effects estimates are provided. OLS requires us to neglect the 
hierarchical character of the data we are dealing with here, in which all workers are grouped 
into larger units, i.e. workplaces. As pointed out by Wooden and Bora (1999), individuals 
from the same workplace have to some extent similar characteristics when compared with 
those from other workplaces. Given the fact that not all these characteristics can be measured 
empirically, it follows that the disturbances might be correlated. In that case, this would 
violate the assumption of independence. A more appropriate error structure is then given by: 
ijjijijijij ZSOSMOSXInw εδγγαα +++++= 2110  (1) 
ijiij e µε +=             (2)  
i= 1, . . . individual N  j= 1, . . . firm J  
 
where lnw is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings, X is a vector of explanatory variables, 
MOS and SOS respectively denote dummies for moderate and severe overskilling and Zj is a 
set of characteristics describing the workplace at which individual i is employed.  The 
composite error term εij consists of two components, ei which is an individual-specific error 
component, varying independently across individuals both within and across firms, and µij 
which is the combined individual and firm error component, i.e. it differs across firms but is 
presumably constant for individuals within the same establishment. This error structure 
captures the random effects model. The usual assumptions under the random effects model 
are:  
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that is, the individual error components are not correlated  with each other and are not auto-
correlated across individuals and workplaces. As a result of these assumptions, all 
disturbances have the following variance:  
  E(εij) = 0         (3) 
222)( µσσσε +== eijVar       (4) 
but for a given j, the disturbances for different individuals are correlated because of their 
common component, λj. As such, an efficient estimator is possible using the generalised least 
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squares method. We should also note that any workplace and firm effects not captured in Zj 
are assumed to be random and hence merged with the disturbance term.  
We can make a number of remarks about the OLS estimates. First, being employed in 
jobs which underutilise one’s skills generates a wage penalty for individual workers. Second, 
this penalty is larger for those who are severely overskilled, approximately 9 (e-0.099 – 1) to 
11% (e-0.116 – 1).19  The corresponding penalty associated with moderate overskilling is much 
lower at around 2 percent but the coefficients here are statistically significant at 0.1. The 
earnings losses reported here, particularly for the combined sample, are in line with 
Mavromaras et al. (2009; 2010) who find earnings penalties that range from 2% (moderate 
overskilling) to 16% (severe overskilling) using Australian data. Third, controlling for 
workplace and firm-specific characteristics (specification 2), reduces the pay penalty for 
severely overskilled workers to around 9% (e-0.099 – 1). Fourth, females experience a lower 
penalty than men (Table 13) from being severely overskilled and this is in line with 
Mavromaras et al. (2010) again using Australian data.   
 The RE estimates reveal a greater pay penalty for severely and moderated overskilled 
workers compared to the OLS estimates.  The penalty for severe overskilling still exceeds 
that of moderate overskilling though the gap between them is narrower and there is no gender 
difference in the overskilling penalty. Using the lagrange multiplier (LM) test, suggests that 
the random effect estimates are more appropriate than OLS.20   Let	  us	  turn	  to	  how	  the	  wage	  penalty	  differs	  across	  different	  educational	  levels.	  In	  particular,	   we	   estimate separately the earnings penalty from overskilling across different 
educational levels.21 Both OLS and RE estimates are generated and these results are 
presented in Table 14. Looking first at the OLS, though the earnings penalty does differ 
considerably by qualification level, the penalty is not evident across all levels of educational 
attainment. Indeed, there is no evidence that overskilling significantly reduces the hourly 
wage for those with university degrees. As such, our results are out of kilter with those of 
Mavromaras et al. (2009; 2010). However, severely overskilled workers do receive a wage 
penalty when they possess mid-level qualifications. In particular, being severely overskilled 
                                                
19 Since the earnings regression specification is in semi-logarithmic form, the percentage point effect (PE) is obtained using the following 
formula: 
 PE = (eβ – 1) x 100, where β is the coefficient estimate. 
20 The LM test is designed to test random effects. The null hypothesis of the one-way random group effect model is that variances of groups 
are zero. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the pooled regression model is appropriate. 
21 Due to the small number of observations reported for those with no/ informal qualification (Table 1), this group is combined with group of 
workers with primary education for easy interpretation. 
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(controlling for both individual and firm characteristics) leads to a reduction in earnings of 
16% (e-0.178 – 1)  and 12% (e-0.125 – 1)  for those with lower secondary and college diploma 
qualifications respectively.  The RE estimates are similar with a higher earnings loss being 
reported for severely overskilled workers with lower secondary qualifications and college 
diploma. Approximately 60% of “unskilled” workers in our dataset possess lower secondary 
qualifications or below and these individuals may be concentrated in sectors where there is 
little in the way of an effective wage floor as there is no minimum wage regulation in 
Malaysia.22 Furthermore, the presence of foreign unskilled workers may also be exerting 
further downward pressure on wages though we do not test explicitly for this. The 
overskilling pay penalty for those with a college diploma is perhaps explained by the fact that 
they may be crowded into lower level jobs which offers fewer opportunities for a successful 
skills match.23  
Previously we found a low degree of correlation between overskilling and 
overeducation. Here we consider what happens to the wage penalty from being overskilled 
when controlling for educational mismatch (i.e. overeducation). Overeducation is measured 
as before using both educational level and field of study.  Four sets of specifications are 
estimated using OLS and RE as presented in Table 15. Specification 1 reproduces our 
previous estimates from Table 12 (Spec 2) which focuses on the effects of skills mismatch. 
The next three specifications add our measures of educational mismatch separately and 
collectively. The reason why we controlled for both measures of overeducation in the 
regression is mainly due to the fact that they capture different things – one focuses on level or 
quantity of education and another one focus on type or field of education. By doing so, this 
allows us to estimate the earnings outcomes of educational mismatch by comparing 
individuals with surplus education who employed in jobs unrelated to their level  of education 
to overeducated workers who employed in jobs not correspond to their field of study.The 
penalty from being severely overskilled remains remarkably unchanged across the various 
specifications.  Under OLS estimates (top table) the pay penalty from being severely 
overskilled is between 8 (e-0.080 – 1) and 9.5% (e-0.099 – 1) and the equivalent RE estimates are 
between 8.5 (e-0.089 – 1) and 10.5% (e-0.112 – 1). The penalty accruing to moderately 
overskilled workers where it exists (the RE estimates) is considerably smaller and this 
declines a little with the inclusion of our educational mismatch terms. The overkilling penalty 
                                                
22 The extent to which workers are skilled is gauged from the employer survey.  
23 Our raw data reveals that 30% of workers with diploma qualifications have ended up in non-production and unskilled jobs.  
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dominates the penalty from being overeducated when one measures overeducation via those 
who work outside their own field.  Where overeducation is measured via levels of education, 
the pay penalty for severe overskilling and overeducation are similar.  
The finding of a robust overskilling penalty is found elsewhere (Mavromaras et. al. 
2010) implying that the reason for the wage penalty is not due to educational mismatch, at 
least not to any significant extent. There could be an argument with respect to unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, following the lines that the overskilled may be less able than the 
well-matched workers in some unobserved respect. The data at hand, however, does not 
allow us to evaluate this since the PICS-II is not a panel data.24 Nevertheless, the fact that 
overskilling has a strongly negative and significant impact on wages implies that it does 
contain important information. 
 We also should acknowledge that apart from overeducation and overskilling, we also 
controlled for undereducation and underskilling (moderately and severely underskilled) in the 
earnings regression. Regardless of OLS or RE estimates, the general findings (not reported 
here) are undereducation leads to a greater wage premium, at around 9 to 11% whereas there 
has no evidence of wage premium for underskilling.  Therefore, we choose to ignore the 
discussion of the results due to our main interested in overeducation and overskilling 
parameters.25 
 
3.4. The Effect of Overskilling on Firm Performance  
As acknowledged above there is a small literature focusing on the effects of mismatch on 
firm performance though few of these studies focus on overskilling. Here we explore the 
effects of overskilling on a range of firm performance measures including average pay, 
absenteeism, quit rates, labour productivity, output per worker and sales per worker. Since 
the focus is on workplace performance, we use a measure of workplace overskilling, and here 
we follow Belfield (2010) where the percentage overskilled is calculated as the average 
probability of being overskilled within the workplace using worker responses. The extent of 
overskilling is similar to that reported at the individual level with approximately 31% of the 
workforce across workplaces being overskilled (23% are moderately overskilled and 8% are 
severely overskilled).  
                                                
24 Indeed, Mavromaras et al. (2010) find that a substantial wage penalty of the overskilled group remains after all unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity has been controlled for (using a fixed effect regression). 
25 The results are available upon request. 
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 Following Belfield (2010), we calculate average workplace pay for all the workers 
who responded to the survey (i.e. monthly earnings reported by respondents) and average 
workplace pay as reported by the manager (i.e. based on a report for all workers at the firm, 
irrespective of whether they were surveyed or not).26 The average workplace pay is in 
Malaysian dollars (RM) 1,621 using the workers’ responses, and RM 1,725 using the 
managers’ statement with a high degree of correlation between the two measures at 0.88. As 
expected, average workplace pay differs considerably across industry, firm size and extent of 
foreign ownership. For example, higher average workplace pay is reported among firms in 
the chemical industry whereas lower pay is reported in the garment industry (RM 2,229 
against RM 946).  
 Mismatch may also reduce work effort and boost absence and quit rates. We measure 
absence rates in terms of the number of man-days lost.27 Specifically, the manager was asked, 
‘Approximately, how many man-days if any did you lose in 2006 due to workers’ due to 
following …” with worker absenteeism being one of the options.28 On average, firms reported 
losing about 21 days in 2006 with the number of days lost higher in the rubber and plastic 
industry (40), large firms and firms who were more than 30% foreign-owned.  
 The third measure of firm performance used is the quit rate, which is calculated using 
responses to the questions, “How many employees resigned in 2006?” and “How many 
employees left for other reasons in 2006?” Using these two questions, we calculate the 
percentage quit rate across workplaces.29 On average, the quit rate was around 13% with 
considerable variation across industry and is higher in larger firms and firms who are more 
than 30% foreign-owned.  
 Following Jones et al. (2009) and the World Bank (2009), we also use labour 
productivity as a measure of firm performance. The argument here is that working in jobs 
which do not correspond to respondents’ actual skills may reduce workers’ productivity since 
part of their accumulated skill and knowledge is not fully utilised.  In the PICS-II, labour 
                                                
26 In particular, the managers were asked to give information on total remuneration (wages and salaries in 2006) for permanent workers. For 
this, we compute the average workplace pay by dividing the total remuneration (wage and salary) by the number of permanent workers for 
each workplace. 
27 Our measure differs from Belfield (2010) and Jones et al. (2009) who using the 2004 WERS for the UK, measure the absence rate in 
terms of the percentage absent in the last 12 months. 
28 Other available options are – (i) strikes, (ii) other stoppages, (iii) worker slowdowns,  (iv) alcoholism, (v) drug abuse, (vi) reported 
sickness, (vii) other labor related causes, (viii) civil unrest, (x) other  
29 Quit rates are calculated by dividing the number of employees who resigned or left for other reasons in 2006 with the number of 
permanent workers reported at the end of fiscal year of 2006. 
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productivity is defined as value-added per worker in Malaysian dollars.30 Labour productivity 
in 2006 for the manufacturing sector as a whole is RM 180,974 with this being considerably 
higher in the chemical industry (RM 485,398). Labour productivity was also found to be 
higher in larger firms and firms who have less than 30% foreign-owned (relative to those 
wholly domestically owned). 
 Another firm performance indicator used is total production per worker. The 
argument here is if mismatch reduces workplace productivity, this may also be reflected in a 
fall in total output (production). Tsang (1987) finds in the context of the US that 
overeducation reduces firm output via reduced job satisfaction. In the PICS-II, there is 
information on total output produced in 2006 and we can calculate average output per worker 
by dividing total output by the total number of permanent workers for each workplace. 
Average output per worker in 2006 is found to be nearly RM 300,000 and the chemical 
industry has an output per worker which is up to four times higher than other industries. 
 Our final indicator of firm performance is sales per worker and this is generated via 
information provided by managers. Here we use total sales per worker (in RM) and average 
total sales per worker for each workplace are RM 364,324 with the highest average sales 
reported in the chemical industry and the lowest in the garment industry (RM 934,207 versus 
RM 56,632). 
Our empirical results are presented in Table 16 to 19 and our results in general are 
supportive of the view that overskilling is deleterious to firm performance.  First, we discuss 
the influence on average workplace pay based both upon the workers’ and managers’ 
responses and these results are presented in Table 16. There are three specifications. In 
specification 1, we control for skills mismatch alongside workplace characteristics. Here we 
find that the higher the presence of severe overskilling at the workplace, the lower is the 
average workplace pay.  Moving from a firm with no overskilled workers to another where 
all the workers are severely overskilled reduces the log average pay by about 17 (e-.186-1) and 
30% (e-.355-1), respectively, using manager’ and workers’ statements. The negative effects are 
in line with those reported by Belfield (2010) for the UK, where the pay penalty from 
overskilling is between 17 and 26%.  
In specification 2, we substitute percentage of educational mismatch for percentage of 
skills mismatch and there are differing results depending on how one measures educational 
                                                
30 For details, see the World Bank (2009), Appendix Annex 2 (p. 206). 
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mismatch. Under our first measure (percentage overeducated), we find that workplace 
overeducation lowers average pay at the workplace and this is evident using both workers’ 
and managers’ statements (the magnitude of the effects are larger under the former). Indeed, 
going from an establishment with no overeducation to one with a higher fraction of 
overeducation reduces workplace average pay by 20(e-.220-1) (managers response) and 34% 
(e-.419-1) (workers response). Under the second measure, we find that a greater proportion of 
workers employed in jobs outside their own field actually leads to  lower average workplace 
pay by 19(e-.209-1) and 23% (e-.261-1), respectively using employers and employees response. 
In specification 3, we control for both educational and skills mismatch percentages and the 
results are similar to the above albeit the negative effects for severe overskilling are smaller 
with larger negative effects being evident from being mismatched by education (both 
overeducation and working outside own field). 
The effects on workers’ absenteeism are reported in Table 17 and there is no evidence 
that skills mismatch at the workplace increases the absence rate (specification 1). This is line 
with Jones et al. (2009) and Belfield (2010) who find no significant impact of overskilling on 
the risk of absenteeism using the 2004 WERS. By contrast, workplace overeducation is 
associated with a higher probability of absenteeism (specifications 2 and 3). The results on 
quit rates are also reported in Table 17 and here we do not find any statistically significant 
association between overskilling and the quit rate. This is somewhat surprising since both 
Jones et al. (2009) and Belfield (2010) find evidence that a higher overskilling increases the 
quit rate at the establishment level though the latter is only the case for the private sector. 31 
However, educational mismatch (measured via overeducation) does boost quit rates.  
Table 18 reports the results for labour productivity and there is no discernible 
relationship between overskilling and labour productivity or production (per worker) and as 
such this is line with the findings of Jones et al. (2009) for the UK. However, we do find that 
workplace overeducation reduces both workplace productivity and production per worker. 
For instance, specification 2 reveals that moving from a workplace with no overeducation to 
another where all workers are considered overeducated leads to a 36% (e-0.451-1) reduction in 
log labour productivity and a 46.5% (e-0.626-1) fall in output per worker.  Finally, we find that 
greater workplace overeducation also strongly reduces firm performance in terms of sales per 
worker (Table 19). This is clearly evident in specifications 2 and 3. Any negative effects of 
                                                
31  We also did another regression where actual number of workers who quit from firms due to resignation or other reasons was used as the 
dependant variable.  There is still no evidence that mismatch incidences increase the number of workers who quit across the workplace. 
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workplace overskilling in terms of sales are only evident in specification 1 and this effect 
dissipates with the inclusion of our educational mismatch terms (specification 3).  
To summarise, we can say that there are negative externalities from having 
overskilled and overeducated workers in the workplace. Severe overskilling reduces average 
workplace pay.  However, the effects of overeducation are more severe and wide ranging 
with lower average workplace pay, higher absenteeism, lower labour productivity, output and 
sales per worker.  
 
4. Conclusions   
This paper represents an attempt to fill a long standing gap in the literature on 
educational and skills mismatch by examining the incidence, determinants, and effects of 
overskilling in the context of a developing country such as Malaysia. We have at our disposal 
a unique workplace dataset that contains extensive individual and workplace level 
information allowing an important focus on workplace characteristics. 
Using workers’ own self-assessment of their skills, we find overskilling to be less of a 
problem in Malaysia compared to other countries. Nearly a third of our sample is overskilled 
but only 8% are severely overskilled. The degree of overskilling is also found to be lower 
among those who possess higher qualifications, particularly a college diploma. With respect 
to educational mismatch, we find an overeducation rate of 18.5% with the majority of 
workers being well matched in terms of education.  However, where overeducation is 
measure via field of education, we find that 57% of workers are believed to be employed in 
jobs that do not correspond to their fields of study. Contrary to our findings with respect to 
overskilling, the degree of overeducation is higher among the highly educated workers. 
Workplace characteristics such as the educational composition of the workforce, labour 
intensity, degree of competition and an emphasis on technical skills in hiring all boost 
overskilling. Though the degree of correlation between overskilling and overeducation is 
found to be low we do find that increased overeducation (both measures) does boost 
overskilling.  
The main finding from the earnings regressions is that whilst the degree of severe 
overskilling is low the penalties in terms of loss in earnings are quite large compared to that 
for the moderately overskilled and well-matched. Indeed, moderate overskilling does not 
translate into a significant disadvantage in terms of pay. The negative effect of overskilling 
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on individual’s earnings is also translated into a reduction in average workplace pay.  
However, the effects of overeducation are more acute with overeducation resulting in lower 
average workplace pay, higher absence rates, lower labour productivity, output per worker 
and sales per worker.  
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Appendix 1  
 
Here we check the representativeness of PICS-II through a comparison with other Malaysian 
data sources including the 2008 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the 2008 Annual Survey of 
Manufacturing (ASM). In particular, we consider reported earnings, hours of work per week, 
educational attainment, marital status, gender and ethnicity.  
 With respect to earnings, the PICS-II data is close to the 2008 AMS. The average monthly 
income among respondents was RM 1,633 using the PICS-II and RM 1,810 using the AMS. 
Unfortunately, the LFS has no information on respondents’ income.  In terms of hours of 
work per week, the PICS-II reports that workers spend on average 45 hours at work per week 
which is close to that reported by the ILO (2008) and LFS (2008), approximately 46 and 48 
hours per week respectively. With respect to educational attainment, the PICS-II is generally 
representative of the Malaysian workforce as a whole. According to the 2008 LFS, the 
majority of workers in 2007 were secondary school-leavers (56%) and a fifth had tertiary 
education (21%) with the corresponding figures of 58% and 22% in the PICS-II.  
  It is a mixed bag with respect to the demographic variables. In terms of marital status 
we have consistency with the 2008 LFS. 34% and 65% of respondents in the manufacturing 
sector in the PICS-II are single and married respectively and the equivalent proportions are 
34% and 63% in the 2008 LFS also for manufacturing. However, there are differences with 
respect to gender and ethnic group composition. The 2008 LFS reports that about 20% of the 
women employed in 2007 were in the manufacturing sector with a corresponding figure of 
17% for men. In the PICS-II, women account for nearly half of the respondents. The PICS-II 
also seems to over-represent Chinese ethnics relative to the 2008 LFS (35% against 26%). 
The proportion of Chinese employed in the manufacturing sector is also higher in the PICS-
II, roughly 35% with a corresponding figure of 28% in the LFS.  
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Table 1            
Descriptive statistics of selected key variables (mean and standard deviation)          
            
Variable 
All Male Female 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age of respondent 34.89 9.83 35.86 9.99 33.91 9.56 
Years of schooling completed 10.35 3.52 10.21 3.63 10.92 3.34 
Education attainment       
No/informal qualification  0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.14 
Primary education 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 
Lower secondary 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 
Upper secondary 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Diploma 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 
Degree  0.09 0.29 0.08 0.29 0.09 0.29 
Prof cert (professional certificate) 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 
Exp (month) 165.45 120.05 181.26 123.15 149.38 114.61 
Tenure (year) 7.60 7.02 7.98 7.36 6.95 6.56 
Train 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Female  0.55 0.45     
Married 0.65 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.62 0.49 
Children under 12 years  0.94 1.18 1.02 1.23 0.87 1.12 
Ethnicity       
Malay 0.55 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.52 0.50 
Chinese 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49 
Indian 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 
Occupation       
Managerial  0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 
Professional 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 
Skilled job 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.28 0.45 
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Clerical/Non-production 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 
Unskilled job 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.42 
Hours of work (weekly) 45.82 12.23 46.81 12.56 44.81 11.81 
Earnings (hourly)  13.96 29.12 15.22 30.10 12.69 28.03 
       Firm age 33.34 4.57 33.39 4.74 33.13 5.96 
Firm size       
Firm size less than  50  0.40 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48 
Firm size 50 to 150  0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47 
Firm size more than  150  0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.46 
Ownership       
Purely domestically-owned 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 
Less than  30% foreign-owned 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21 
More than  30% foreign-owned 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45 
Share of workforce with university qualifications      
Graduates less than  25%  0.76 0.42 0.76 0.43 0.77 0.42 
Graduates 25 to 50%  0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 
Graduates more than 50%  0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 
       Share of labour cost of the total cost       
Labour cost  less than 25%  0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.63 0.48 
Labour cost 25 to 50% 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 
Labour cost 51 to75%  0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.25 
Labour cost more than 75% 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.15 
       Firm train (firm providing on-the-job 
training) 
0.52 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.50 
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     Table 2    
The incidence of overskilling across workers   
     
  
All 
(n = 10,302) 
Male 
(n = 5,610) 
Female 
(n = 4,692)  
% % % 
 
Statement 1* 
 
Do not agree at all 8.1 8.8 7.3 
 
Somewhat agree 22.9 23.5 22.1 
 
Agree 54.7 53.0 56.7 
 
Agree completely 14.3 14.7 13.9 
 
Total 100 100 100 
 
     Overskilling 
     
Well-matched 69.0 67.7 70.6 
  
Moderately overskilled 22.9 23.5 22.1 
  
Severely overskilled 8.1 8.8 7.3 
  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
   Source: Productivity Climate Investment Survey 2007 (PCIS-2)  
  * Your current job offers you sufficient scope to use your knowledge and skills. 
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Table 3     
The incidence of underskilling across workers  
      
  
All Male Female 
  
% % % 
  
Statement 2* 
    
Do not agree at all 3.9 4.0 3.7 
 
Somewhat agree 15.8 17.0 14.4 
 
Agree 55.8 55.3 56.5 
 
Agree completely 24.5 23.7  25.4 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
     
     
Underskilling 
     
Well-matched 19.7 21.0 18.1 
  
Moderately underskilled 55.8 55.3 56.5 
  
Severely underskilled 24.5 23.7 25.4 
  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
Source:  Productivity Climate Investment Survey 2007 (PCIS-2)  
* You would perform better in your current job if you possess additional knowledge and skills. 
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Table 4 
Education required for current job  and the incidence of over-education using conventional measure  
(percentage) 
    
 
All 
(n = 10,302) 
Male 
(n = 5,610) 
Female 
(n = 4,692) 
Statement 3* 
   
Degree 11.7 12.9 10.5 
Diploma 19.1 18.0 20.2 
Upper secondary 37.0 36.9 37.2 
Lower secondary 21.0 20.9 21.1 
Primary 7.0 6.5 7.5 
Informal/no qualification 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Educational mismatch    
Well-matched 51.9 48.7 55.7 
Overeducated 18.5 18.5 18.6 
Undereducated 29.6 32.8 25.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Productivity Climate Investment Survey 2007 (PCIS-2)   
*According to you, what is the most appropriate level of education for the work you are    doing? 
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Table 5 
      
Field of education required to do current job (percentage) 
       
  
Pooled 
(n = 10,302) 
Male 
(n = 5,610) 
Female 
(n = 4,692) 
Statement 4*    
Only your own field 6.7 7.0 6.3 
Related to your field 36.7 35.2 38.5 
Completely different from your field 17.3 17.8 16.6 
No specific field is required for this 39.3 39.9 38.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
    Field of education  
   
Only your/related to  own field 43.4 42.3 44.8 
Outside of own field 56.6 57.7 55.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
             Source: Productivity Climate Investment Survey 2007 (PCIS-2)  
             * According to you, what is the most appropriate field of education for the work you are doing? 
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Table 6 
  Percentage of Overskilled by Overeducation 
   
Skills utilisation  
Educational mismatch 
Overeducated  Outside own field 
Pooled 
  
Skill-matched 65.4 65.9 
Moderately overskilled 24.7 25.0 
Severely overskilled   9.9   9.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Male 
  
Skill-matched 64.6 66.8 
Moderately overskilled 26.6 24.9 
Severely overskilled   8.8   8.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Female 
  
Skill-matched 66.1 65.1 
Moderately overskilled 23.0 25.1 
Severely overskilled 10.9   9.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
   Total 17.5 48.9 
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Table 7 
Percentage of Overeducation by Overskilling 
     
Educational mismatch 
All  Male Female 
Moderately  
Overskilled 
Severely  
Overskilled 
Moderately  
Overskilled 
Severely  
Overskilled 
Moderately  
Overskilled 
Severely  
Overskilled 
Overeducated  20.0 25.7 21.0 23.4 19.1 28.1 
       Outside of own field  62.8 73.5 62.9 71.0 62.7 75.7 
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Table 8  
Determinants of overskilling among workers - marginal effects  
 
      
 
 
Pooled Male Female 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Demographic backgrounds            
Female 0.001 
 
0.005 
         
 
0.009 
 
0.005 
         
Married -0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.007 
 
0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
0.015 
 
0.006 
 
Child12 -0.010 ** -0.007 *** -0.013 ** -0.006 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 ** 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.006 
 
0.004 
 
0.007 
 
0.003 
 
Race (ref – Malay) 
            
Chinese 0.036 *** 0.000 
 
0.030 * 0.002 
 
0.040 *** -0.001 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.016 
 
0.008 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
Indian 0.035 ** -0.010 
 
0.019 
 
-0.012 
 
0.055 ** -0.011 
 
 
0.016 
 
0.009 
 
0.023 
 
0.014 
 
0.022 
 
0.010 
 
Educational attainment ( ref - 
no/primary education)           
Lower secondary 0.009 
 
-0.025 *** 0.017 
 
-0.013 * 0.003 
 
-0.036 *** 
 
0.013 
 
0.006 
 
0.018 
 
0.008 
 
0.021 
 
0.008 
 
Upper secondary -0.045 *** -0.037 *** -0.049 *** -0.031 *** -0.038 * -0.037 *** 
 
0.014 
 
0.006 
 
0.018 
 
0.008 
 
0.021 
 
0.008 
 
Diploma -0.078 *** -0.049 *** -0.047 * -0.037 ** -0.105 *** -0.054 *** 
 
0.020 
 
0.010 
 
0.028 
 
0.015 
 
0.029 
 
0.013 
 
Degree  -0.022 
 
-0.038 *** -0.027 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.047 *** 
 
0.022 
 
0.013 
 
0.033 
 
0.019 
 
0.032 
 
0.016 
 
Exp (month) 0.000 * 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 *** 0.000 * 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
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Training -0.015 
 
-0.020 *** -0.015 
 
-0.036 *** -0.013 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
0.014 
 
0.008 
 
0.014 
 
0.007 
 
Prof cert -0.047 *** 0.000 
 
-0.052 ** 0.008 
 
-0.033 
 
-0.006 
 
 
0.016 
 
0.009 
 
0.021 
 
0.011 
 
0.024 
 
0.013 
 
             N 9,971 
   
5,380 
   
4,591 
   
Pseudo R-sq 0.071 
   
0.086 
   
0.068 
   Log-likelihood -7358.2 
   
-3989.7 
   
-3309.3 
    Robust standard error in italics 
Other covariates – household size, region (5), work distance (km), job tenure, unionisation and number of job held in the past 
 *, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01       
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
Table 9  
Workplace characteristics and the determinants of overskilling (marginal effects)  
  All Male Female 
  Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Share of workforce with university 
qualifications  (ref – Graduates less than 
25% )           
Graduates 25 to 50%  -0.017 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.009 
 
 
0.012 
 
0.006 
 
0.017 
 
0.008 
 
0.018 
 
0.008 
 
Graduates more than 50%   -0.025 
 
-0.052 *** -0.029 
 
-0.062 *** -0.030 
 
-0.035 * 
 
0.022 
 
0.014 
 
0.028 
 
0.018 
 
0.034 
 
0.021 
 
Firm size (ref  - firm size less 
than 50)             
Firm size 50 to 150  -0.006 
 
0.011 ** -0.006 
 
0.019 ** -0.009 
 
0.001 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.016 
 
0.008 
 
0.017 
 
0.007 
 
Firm size more than 150  -0.008 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
0.015 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.014 
 
 
0.014 
 
0.007 
 
0.020 
 
0.010 
 
0.020 
 
0.009 
 
Ownership (ref –Purely domestically-owned) 
          
Less than 30% foreign-owned -0.021 
 
-0.058 *** -0.018 
 
-0.053 *** -0.067 ** -0.072 ** 
 
0.022 
 
0.017 
 
0.032 
 
0.020 
 
0.031 
 
0.029 
 
More than 30% foreign-owned 0.039 *** -0.007 
 
0.042 *** -0.008 
 
0.038 ** -0.004 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.016 
 
0.008 
 
0.017 
 
0.007 
 
Share of labour cost of the total cost (ref -  
Labour cost less than 25%)           
Labour cost 25 to 50% 0.014 
 
0.004 
 
0.019 
 
0.006 
 
0.008 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
0.015 
 
0.006 
 
0.015 
 
0.006 
 
Labour cost 51 to75%  0.022 
 
-0.003 
 
0.025 
 
-0.023 * 0.023 
 
0.007 
 
 
0.017 
 
0.008 
 
0.023 
 
0.012 
 
0.027 
 
0.009 
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Labour cost more than 75%  0.022 
 
0.012 
 
0.049 
 
0.032 ** -0.001 
 
-0.017 
 
 
0.027 
 
0.012 
 
0.035 
 
0.015 
 
0.042 
 
0.019 
 
Number of competitors (ref – No competitor) 
          
Competitor less than 25  0.029 
 
-0.012 
 
0.093 ** -0.018 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.003 
 
 
0.022 
 
0.008 
 
0.037 
 
0.013 
 
0.027 
 
0.009 
 
Competitor more than 25  0.025 
 
-0.024 ** 0.125 *** -0.042 *** -0.058 * -0.001 
 
 
0.026 
 
0.010 
 
0.041 
 
0.016 
 
0.034 
 
0.012 
 
Hiring practice 
            
Education-based 0.023 ** -0.010 ** 0.008 
 
-0.012 ** 0.038 *** -0.009 
 
 
0.009 
 
0.004 
 
0.013 
 
0.006 
 
0.014 
 
0.005 
 
Work exp-based 0.022 * 0.010 * 0.007 
 
0.010 
 
0.039 ** 0.010 
 
 
0.012 
 
0.006 
 
0.017 
 
0.007 
 
0.019 
 
0.008 
 
Technical-based -0.010 
 
-0.010 ** -0.004 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.009 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
0.016 
 
0.006 
 
             Firm train -0.014
 
-0.007
 
0.007
 
-0.005
 
-0.032 ** -0.009
 
 
0.011 
 
0.005 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
0.016 
 
0.006 
 
             No. of observation 9,814
   
5,285
   
4,529
   
No. of firm 1,013 
   
1,013 
   
1,013 
   Pseudo R-sq 0.081 
   
0.092 
   
0.083 
   Log-likelihood -7147.5 
   
-3850.5 
   
-3207.6 
   Log likelihood ratio test (χ) 426.2 *** 278.4 *** 203.4 *** 
Robust standard error in italics 
Other covariates- firm age,  share of women workers of the total workforce (3), share of foreign skilled workers of the total 
skilled (3) worker and  over-staffed firm     
*, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
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Table 10  
The effects of educational mismatch on worker overskilling - marginal effects 
 
 
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
Moderately-
overskilled 
Severely-
overskilled 
All 
            
Overeducated  0.029 ** 0.021 *** 
    
0.023 * 0.017 *** 
 
0.012 
 
0.005 
     
0.012 
 
0.005 
 
Outside of own field 
   
0.052 *** 0.036 *** 0.049 *** 0.032 *** 
     
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
0.010 
 
0.005 
 
             N 9700 
   
9700 
   
9700 
   
Pseudo R-sq 0.088 
   
0.091 
   
0.094 
   Log-likelihood -7008.1 
   
-6987.1 
   
-6965.3 
   Log likelihood ratio test (χ) 278.88 *** 
  
320.8 *** 
  
364.4 *** 
               Male 
            
Overeducated  0.048 *** 0.017 ** 
    
0.043 *** 0.012 * 
 
0.017 
 
0.007 
     
0.017 
 
0.007 
 
Outside of own field 
   
0.049 *** 0.038 *** 0.044 *** 0.034 *** 
     
0.014 
 
0.006 
 
0.014 
 
0.006 
 
             N 5217 
   
5217 
   
5217 
   
Pseudo R-sq 0.114 
   
0.112 
   
0.116 
   Log-likelihood -3755.7 
   
-3747.3 
   
-3732.3 
   Log likelihood ratio test (χ) 189.6 *** 
  
206.4 *** 
  
236.4 *** 
               Female 
            
Overeducated  0.001 
 
0.021 *** 
    
-0.006 
 
0.019 *** 
 
0.018 
 
0.006 
     
0.018 
 
0.006 
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Outside of own field 
   
0.059 *** 0.026 *** 0.058 *** 0.023 *** 
     
0.014 
 
0.006 
 
0.014 
 
0.006 
 
             N 4483 
   
4483 
   
4483 
   
Pseudo R-sq 0.092 
   
0.094 
   
0.097 
   Log-likelihood -3148.0 
   
-3138.9 
   
-3130.7 
   Log likelihood ratio test (χ) 119.2 *** 
  
137.4 *** 
  
153.8*** 
   Robust standard error in italics 
*, **, and *** respectively 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
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Table 11  
The determinants of workplace mismatch  
 
  Overskilling  Moderate overskilling 
Severe 
overskilling 
Share of workforce with university qualifications (ref – Graduates less than 25%) 
 
Graduates 25 to 50% -0.054 * -0.034 
 
-0.02 
 
 
0.029 
 
0.025 
 
0.017 
 
Graduates more than 50% -0.098 ** -0.019 
 
-0.079 *** 
 
0.044 
 
0.039 
 
0.024 
 
Firm train -0.054 ** -0.034 * -0.019 
 
 
0.023 
 
0.02 
 
0.014 
 
Firm size (ref –firm size less than 50 emp) 
      
Firm size 50 to 150 emp -0.031 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.003 
 
 
0.025 
 
0.022 
 
0.016 
 
Firm size more than 150 emp -0.051 * -0.035 
 
-0.016 
 
 
0.027 
 
0.025 
 
0.016 
 
Ownership (ref – purely domestically-owned) 
     
Less than 30% foreign-owned -0.036 
 
0.007 
 
-0.043 *** 
 
0.033 
 
0.032 
 
0.013 
 
More than 30% foreign-owned 0.03 
 
0.031 
 
-0.001 
 
 
0.023 
 
0.021 
 
0.012 
 
Share of labour cost of the total cost (ref -  
Labour cost less than 25%) 
      
Labour cost 25 to 50% 0.013  0.005  0.020  
 (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.016)  
Labour cost 51 to75%  0.009  -0.002  0.011  
 (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.027)  
Labour cost more than 75%  0.012  0.019  0.034  
 (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.041)  
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Hiring practice  
      
Education-based 0.03 
 
0.012 
 
0.018 
 
 
0.025 
 
0.023 
 
0.015 
 
Work exp-based -0.012 
 
0.01 
 
-0.022 * 
 
0.02 
 
0.018 
 
0.012 
 
Technical-based -0.034 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.013 
 
 
0.024 
 
0.021 
 
0.014 
 
_cons 0.444 *** 0.246 *** 0.199 *** 
 
0.072 
 
0.063 
 
0.049 
 
       No. of firm 1,013 
 
1,013 
 
1,013 
 
R-square 0.117 
 
0.058 
 
0.096 
 
Adjusted R-sq 0.081   0.019   0.059   
Robust standard error in italics           
Other explanatory variables – female workforce composition (3), firm competitors (3), labour cost (4), firm age  and dummies 
for under-staffed and over-staffed firm. 
*, ** and ***, respectively denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
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Table 12  
The effects of overskilling on earnings across workers 
 
log wage (hourly) 
OLS   RE 
Spec 1 Spec  2   Spec 1 Spec  2 
          Skill utilisation (ref - well-matched) 
Moderately overskilled -0.022 * -0.023 * 
 
-0.055 *** -0.053 *** 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
  
0.013 
 
0.013 
 
Severely overskilled -0.116 *** -0.099 *** 
 
-0.123 *** -0.112 *** 
 
0.017 
 
0.017 
  
0.020 
 
0.021 
 
          Individual characteristic Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
          Workplace attributes No 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
Yes 
 
          N 9,952   9,787     9,952   9,787   
No. of firms 
     
1,034 
 
1,019 
 
R-sq 0.677 
 
0.691 
      
adj. R-sq 0.676 
 
0.689 
      
R-sq – overall 
     
0.672 
 
0.687 
 
Rho (ρ) 
     
0.326 
 
0.317 
 
   
603.09 *** 
     
LM test 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	     1719.3 *** 4017.4 *** 
Notes: Other explanatory variables are individuals' characteristics (education and work experience) demographic characteristics 
(race, gender,  marital status, children and household member) spatial elements (region, work distance and commuting time), last 
unemployed, job attributes (occupational level, tenure, hours of work, number of job held and union member) and the workplace 
characteristics - firm size (3), industry (9), firm ownership (3),  hiring system (3), labour cost (4), firm age, KLSE, firm provided 
training and workforce composition (university, secondary, female and foreign skilled workers) 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* , **, and *** denote 0.1,0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
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  Table 13 Wage effects of overskilling by gender 
 
 
OLS RE 
Male Female Male Female 
Skills mismatch (ref-well-matched) 
  
  
    
Moderately-overskilled -0.024 
 
-0.023  -0.050 *** -0.052 *** 
 
0.017 
 
0.016  0.018 
 
0.018 
 
Severely-overskilled -0.103 *** -0.083 *** -0.094 *** -0.106 *** 
 
0.024 
 
0.026  0.025 
 
0.029 
 
Cons 3.198 *** 2.729 *** 3.112 *** 2.782 *** 
 
0.089 
 
0.090  0.123 
 
0.117 
 
N 5,273 
 
4,514  5,273 
 
4,514 
 
No. of firm 
  
  972 
 
934 
 
R-square 0.685 
 
0.702  
    
Adjusted R-sq 0.681 
 
0.697  
    
Overall R-sq 
  
  0.681 
 
0.699 
 
Rho (ρ) 
  
  0.359 
 
0.354 
 
LM test     1508.470 ***     1317.660 *** 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* , **, and *** denote 0.1,0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
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 Table 14  
 The effect of overskilling on earnings across education levels  
  
 Log hourly wage No/primary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary 
Diploma 
college 
University 
degree 
OLS 
          
Skills mismatch (ref-Well-matched) 
        
Moderately-overskilled 0.032 
 
-0.042 * -0.013 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.058 
 
 
0.026 
 
0.024 
 
0.020 
 
0.037 
 
0.041 
 
Severely -overskilled -0.045 
 
-0.178 *** -0.015 
 
-0.125 * -0.070 
 
 
0.034 
 
0.033 
 
0.029 
 
0.068 
 
0.066 
 
           Cons 3.455 *** 3.035 *** 3.177 *** 3.534 *** 3.910 *** 
 
0.162 
 
0.140 
 
0.102 
 
0.156 
 
0.226 
 
           N 1,536 
 
2,457 
 
3,766 
 
1,191 
 
837 
 
R-square 0.683 
 
0.627 
 
0.661 
 
0.702 
 
0.7 
 
Adjusted R-square 0.668 
 
0.616 
 
0.655 
 
0.683 
 
0.673 
 
           
           RE 
          
Skills mismatch (ref-Well-matched) 
        
Moderately-overskilled -0.007 
 
-0.042 * -0.052 ** -0.030 
 
-0.060 
 
 
0.029 
 
0.025 
 
0.021 
 
0.037 
 
0.044 
 
Severely -overskilled -0.049 
 
-0.144 *** -0.055 * -0.134 ** -0.074 
 
 
0.038 
 
0.038 
 
0.031 
 
0.062 
 
0.059 
 
           Cons 3.400 *** 3.143 *** 3.001 *** 3.446 *** 3.901 *** 
 
0.193 
 
0.180 
 
0.132 
 
0.170 
 
0.238 
 
           N 1,536 
 
2,457 
 
3,766 
 
1,191 
 
837 
 
No. of firm 531 
 
767 
 
908 
 
564 
 
400 
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Overall R-sq 0.673 
 
0.623 
 
0.656 
 
0.697 
 
0.698 
 
Rho (ρ) 0.573 
 
0.319 
 
0.389 
 
0.381 
 
0.13 
 
LM test 361.64 *** 576.15 *** 783.52 *** 41.65 *** 16.93 *** 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* , **, and *** denote 0.1,0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 15  
The effect of overskilling and over-education on individual earnings 
 
log hourly earnings Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 4 
OLS 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Educational mismatch 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overeducated  
	   	  
-0.077 *** 
  
-0.074 *** 
	   	   	  
0.013 
   
0.013 
 
	   	   	         Outside of own field  
 	     
-0.041 *** -0.027 *** 
	   	   	     
0.010 
 
0.010 
 
Skills mismatch  
	   	         
Moderately-overskilled -0.023 *	   -0.017 
 
-0.020 * -0.015 
 
	  
0.012 
	  
0.012 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
 
Severely-overskilled -0.099 *** -0.084 *** -0.093 *** -0.080 *** 
	  
0.017 
	  
0.017 
 
0.017 
 
0.017 
 
	   	   	         N 9,787 
	  
9,787 
 
9,787 
 
9,787 
 
R-square 0.691 
	  
0.696 
 
0.692 
 
0.696 
	  
Adjusted R-sq 0.689 
	  
0.693 
 
0.689 
 
0.693 
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  RE 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Educational mismatch 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Overeducated 
	   	  
-0.094 *** 
  
-0.088 *** 
	   	   	  
0.013 
   
0.013 
 
	   	   	         Outside of own field  
 	     
-0.061 *** -0.045 *** 
	   	   	     
0.013 
 
0.012 
 
Skills mismatch  
	   	         
Moderately-overskilled -0.053 *** -0.047 *** -0.048 *** -0.043 *** 
	  
0.013 
	  
0.013 
 
0.013 
 
0.013 
 
Severely-overskilled -0.112 *** -0.094 *** -0.103 *** -0.089 *** 
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-0.021 
	  
0.021 
 
0.021 
 
0.020 
 
	   	   	         N 9,787 
	  
9,787 
 
9,787 
 
9,787 
	  
No. of group 1,019 
	  
1,019 
 
1,019 
 
1,019 
	  
Overall R-sq 0.687 
	  
0.691 
 
0.687 
 
0.692 
 
Rho (ρ) 0.317   0.320   0.319   0.321 	  	  
LM test 4017.4 *** 4051.5 *** 4039.2 *** 4072.7 ***	  
Source: Productivity Climate Investment Survey 2007 (PCIS-2)           
Robust Standard errors in parentheses  
* , **, and *** denote 0.1,0.05, and 0.01, respectively 
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   Table 16  
   The effect of workplace mismatch on workplace average pay 
 
Log average pay 
Respondents' response Managers' response 
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Skill mismatch 
            
Moderate overskilling (%) -0.034 
   
-0.017 
 
0.028 
   
0.040 
 
 
0.087 
   
0.085 
 
0.071 
   
0.070 
 
Severe overskilling (%) -0.355 *** 
  
-0.281 *** -0.186 *** 
  
-0.136 * 
 
0.111 
   
0.111 
 
0.078 
   
0.078 
 
Educational mismatch 
           
Overeducation (%) 
  
-0.419 *** -0.399 *** 
  
-0.220 *** -0.212 *** 
   
0.087 
 
0.087 
   
0.069 
 
0.069 
 
Outside of own field (%) 
  
-0.261 *** -0.239 *** 
  
-0.209 *** -0.200 *** 
   
0.057 
 
0.056 
   
0.044 
 
0.044 
 
                                                                 Cons 8.704 *** 8.862 *** 8.886 *** 6.566 *** 6.722 *** 6.671 *** 
 
0.186 
 
0.194 
 
0.198 
 
0.154 
 
0.165 
 
0.170 
 
----------- --------- ---- --------- ---- --------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- 
N 1,003 
 
1,003 
 
1,003 
 
1,003 
 
1,003 
 
1,003 
 
R-square 0.307 
 
0.330 
 
0.340 
 
0.302 
 
0.324 
 
0.329 
 
Adjusted r-sq 0.274   0.299   0.306   0.269   0.293   0.296   
Robust Standard error in parenthesis; *, **, and ***, respectively donate 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01          
Notes: other controlled variables – log (K), log (L), firm’s competitors (3), the percent of female workforce composition, 
dummy KLSE, dummies for over-staffed and under-staffed firm, hiring practice (education, experience and technical) and 
labour cost (4). 
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    Table 17 
    The effect of workplace overskilling/over-education on absenteeism and quite rate  
 
  Log absenteeism Quit rate 
  Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 
Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3   
Skill mismatch 
            
Moderate overskilling (%) 0.108 
   
0.115 
 
0.141 
   
0.157 
 
 
0.205 
   
0.202 
 
0.195 
   
0.195 
 
Severe overskilling (%) 0.516 
   
0.530 
 
-0.038 
   
0.003 
 
 
0.330 
   
0.326 
 
0.285 
   
0.290 
 
Educational mismatch 
            
Overeducation (%) 
  
0.732 *** 0.703 *** 
 
0.250 
 
0.278 
 
   
0.249 
 
0.249 
   
0.238 
 
0.238 
 
Outside of own field (%) 
  
-0.208 
 
-0.246 * 
  
-0.220 
 
-0.201 
 
   
0.142 
 
0.143 
   
0.141 
 
0.142 
 
             Cons 0.316 
 
0.266
 
-0.064
 
0.096 * 0.088 * 0.072
 
 
0.530 
 
0.593 
 
0.599 
 
0.049 
 
0.051 
 
0.053 
 
---------- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- 
N 1,020 
 
1,020 
 
1,020 
 
1,021 
 
1,021 
 
1,021 
 
R-square 0.093 
 
0.100 
 
0.103 
 
0.120 
 
0.120 
 
0.123 
 
Adjusted R-sq 0.051   0.059   0.058   0.089   0.088   0.093   
Robust standard error in parenthesis; *, ** and ***, respectively denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01                       
Notes: other controlled variables - firm competitors (3), the percent of female workforce composition, dummy KLSE, dummies 
for over-staffed and under-staffed firm, hiring practice (education, experience and technical) and labour cost (4). 
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  Table 18 
  The effects of workplace mismatch on productivity and production per worker  
 
  Log productivity  Log production per worker 
  Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Skill mismatch 
            
Moderate overskilling (%) -0.230 
   
-0.223 
 
-0.036 
   
-0.024 
 
 
0.143 
   
0.140 
 
0.166 
   
0.163 
 
Severe overskilling (%) -0.229 
   
-0.205 
 
0.052 
   
0.155 
 
 
0.218 
   
0.221 
 
0.244 
   
0.242 
 
Educational mismatch 
            
Overeducation (%) 
  
-0.451 *** -0.435 *** 
  
-0.626 *** -0.629 *** 
   
0.163 
 
0.163 
   
0.200 
 
0.200 
 
Outside of own field (%)  
  
-0.067 
 
-0.086 
   
-0.123 
 
-0.126 
 
   
0.101 
 
0.102 
   
0.117 
 
0.117 
 
                                                                 _cons 10.940 *** 10.843 *** 11.107 *** 12.550 *** 12.291 *** 12.500 *** 
 
0.403 
 
0.426 
 
0.442 
 
0.650 
 
0.668 
 
0.677 
 
----------- --------- ---- --------- ---- --------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- ---------- --- 
N 1,016 
 
1,016 
 
1,016 
 
847 
 
847 
 
847 
 
R-square 0.257 
 
0.260 
 
0.263 
 
0.698 
 
0.702 
 
0.702 
 
Adjusted R-sq 0.218   0.222   0.222   0.681   0.685   0.684   
                   Robust standard error in parenthesis; *, ** and ***, respectively denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
Notes: other controlled variables - log (K), log (L), firm’s competitors (3), the percent of female workforce composition, 
dummy   KLSE, dummies for over-staffed and under-staffed firm, hiring practice (education, experience and technical) and 
labour cost (4). 
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   Table 19 
   The effect of workplace overskilling/over-education on sales (RM)  
 
Log value sales per worker (RM) Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3   
Skill mismatch 
      
Moderate overskilling (%) -0.125 
   
-0.103 
 
 
0.149 
   
0.148 
 
Severe overskilling (%) -0.366 * 
  
-0.277 
 
 
0.195 
   
0.196 
 
Educational mismatch 
      
Overeducation (%) 
  
-0.601 *** -0.578 *** 
   
0.158 
 
0.157 
 
Outside of own field (%) 
  
-0.179 * -0.023 
 
   
0.100 
 
0.102 
 
_cons 12.565 *** 12.582 *** 12.764 *** 
 
0.552 
 
0.580 
 
0.582 
 
----------- --------- ---- --------- ---- --------- ---- 
N 1,024 
 
1,024 
 
1,024 
 
R-square 0.710 
 
0.711 
 
0.714 
 
Adjusted R-sq 0.655   0.654   0.658   
Robust standard error in parenthesis; *, ** and ***, respectively denote 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
Notes: other controlled variables - log (K), log (L), firm’s competitors (3), the percent of female workforce composition, 
dummy KLSE, dummy for over-staffed and under-staffed firm, hiring practice (education, experience and technical) and 
labour cost (4). 
  
            
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
 
 
 Variable  Definition  
Educational attainment   
No/Primary education = 1 if no/primary education, 0 otherwise 
Lower secondary = 1 if lower secondary education, 0 otherwise 
Upper secondary = 1 if upper secondary  education, 0 otherwise 
Diploma = 1 if college diploma,  0 otherwise 
Degree  = 1 if university degree, 0 otherwise 
Exp (month) = Potential work experience, age minus the number of years of formal  
education minus 6. 
Train = 1 if a worker receive a formal training, 0 otherwise 
Prof cert = 1 if a worker has a professional or skills training certification, 0 otherwise 
Female = 1 if female, 0 otherwise 
Married = 1 if married, otherwise 
Child12 = The number of household members less than 12 years-old 
Race  
Malay = 1 if Malay, 0 otherwise 
Chinese  = 1 if Chinese, 0 otherwise 
Indian = 1 if Indian, 0 otherwise 
      Educational-skills mismatch 
Overeducated = 1 if overeducated, 0 otherwise 
Undereducated = 1 if under-educated, 0 otherwise 
Outside of own field = 1 if  a worker is employed outside own field/unrelated to their field of study,  
0 otherwise 
Moderately overskilled = 1 if moderately overskilled, 0 otherwise 
Severely overskilled = 1 if severely overskilled, 0 otherwise 
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Firm age = Age of firm 
Share of workforce with a university qualification 
Graduates  less than 25% = 1 if the share is less than 25%,  0 otherwise 
Graduates 25 to 50% = 1 if the share is between 25% and 50%, 0 otherwise 
Graduates  more than 50% = 1 if the share is more than 50%, 0 otherwise 
Firm size  
Firm size less than 50 emp = 1 if firm has less than 50 employees 
Firm size 50 to 150 emp = 1 if firm between 50 and 50 employees, 0 otherwise 
Firm size  more than 150 emp  = 1 if firm has more than 150 employees, 0 otherwise 
Firm ownership –P 
Purely domestically-owned = 1 if firm is purely domestically owned 
Less than 30% foreign-owned = 1 if foreign ownership is less than 30%, 0 otherwise 
more than 30% foreign-owned = 1 if foreign ownership is more than 30%, 0 otherwise 
Share of labour cost of firm total cost 
Labour cost less than 25% = 1 if labour cost less than 25% of total cost, 0 otherwise 
Labour cost 25 to 50% = 1 if labour costs between 25 and 50% of total cost, 0 otherwise  
Labour cost  51 to 75% = 1 if labour costs between 51 and 75% of total cost, 0 otherwise 
Labour cost more than 75% = 1 if labour costs more than 75% of total cost, 0 otherwise 
Hiring system  
Education-based = 1 if education is the most important considerations in recruiting, 0 otherwise 
Work exp-based = 1 if work experience is the most important considerations in recruiting, 0 
otherwise 
Technical-based = 1 if technical skills is the most important considerations in recruiting, 0 
otherwise 
Firm competitor 
No competitor = 1 if firm has no competitor 
Competitor less than 25  = 1 if firm has less than 25 competitors, 0 otherwise 
Competitor more than 25  = 1 if firm has more than 25 competitors, 0 otherwise 
  Firm train = 1 if firm providing training programmes at the workplace, 0 otherwise 
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LogL = Total number of employees in 2006 (in log) 
LogK = Total cost paid for rent capital in 2006 (machinery, building or land) 
     Source: 2007 Productivity Climate Investment Survey  
 
 
 
